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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(a), this Court has jurisdiction to 
review the opinion rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals on July 17, 2008. Further, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(5) and Utah R. App. P. 45, this Court has 
jurisdiction to review said opinion pursuant to the Court's order dated November 20, 
2008 granting Appellant River Crossing's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4), the following question is presented for this 
Court's determination, together with any subsidiary questions fairly included therein: 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its determination of what constitutes an 
appearance for purposes of rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
REFERENCE TO REPORTED DECISION 
OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision was reported as Arbogast Family Trust v. 
River Crossings. LLC, 2008 UT App 277. 191 P.3d 39. 
1 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
URCP Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. 
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court, 
every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent 
to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written motion other 
than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that: 
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court; 
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be 
served with all pleadings and papers; 
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing 
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party; 
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of judgment 
under Rule 58A(d); and 
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in default 
for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
(Emphasis added). 
URCP Rule 55. Default.1 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the 
amount claimed and costs against the defendant if: 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear; 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be 
made certain by computation. 
(Emphasis added). 
1
 As discussed in Section V herein, Rule 55(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is distinctly different than Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of the Case 
Appellant River Crossings, LLC ("River Crossings") seeks the certiorari review of 
the Utah Court of Appeals' decision entered on July 17, 20082 wherein it was held that in 
order for a party to "appear" for purposes of Rule 5(a)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a party is required to make a presentation or submission to the trial court. 
Arbogast suggests the nature of this case review also involves an analysis of the meaning 
of the word "appearance" as is relates to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 
55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
River Crossings advocates the deviation from long-standing policy in order to 
adopt a liberal approach so as to allow even the slightest of efforts3 by a party to 
constitute "appearance" for URCP Rule 5 and Rule 55 purposes. River Crossings 
supports its position by stating that "virtually all of the federal courts to have considered 
this issue have adopted the position that an 'appearance' under the federal counterpart 
merely requires an indication of a 'clear purpose to defend the suit.'" (Appellant Brief at 
Pg. 3, Tfl citing New York v. Green. 420 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2005)). Contrary to River 
Crossings' blanket assertion, the federal circuits are split as to whether an "appearance" 
requires nominal efforts, such as a mere telephone call, as advocated by River Crossings, 
2
 Reported as Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings. LLC, 191 P.3d 39 (2008). 
3
 River Crossings cites to Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966) wherein a 
single telephone request for extension by counsel constituted appearance. 
3 
or whether a party must meet a higher but reasonable threshold and actually prove a 
"clear purpose to defend the suit.55 Id. See e.g. Wilson v. Moore & Associates, Inc., 564 
F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1977)("informal contacts55 between party and plaintiffs counsel 
did not rise to the level of a formal court appearance); Direct Mail Specialist Inc. v. Eclat 
Computerized Technologies. Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988)(communication 
between counsel did not "rise to the level this court required in Wilson55 for appearance 
purposes). 
In Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 191 P.3d 39 (Utah Ct. App. 
2008) the Utah Court of Appeals supports the long-standing policy that imposes a duty 
upon parties to use due diligence when pursuing or defending an action. Such a "bright-
line455 rule removes ambiguity of the meaning of "appearance55, gives deference to this 
Court's construction of the rules of civil procedure and provides a just, expedient and 
predictable judicial process. 
Furthermore, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure already provide a medium that 
protects the "oft-repeated public policy disfavoring default judgments and disposition of 
cases on procedural technicalities;555 namely Rule 60(b) motions. Utah courts have 
provided ample guidance in determining whether a party may be relieved from a 
judgment, default or otherwise. To open Pandora's box further to include questions 
4Id. atn. 9. 
5
 See Appellant Brief at Pg. 3, f 2. 
4 
regarding appearance that will require a separate analysis in addition to a Rule 60(b) 
analysis will only provide non-diligent parties additional means to protract litigation. 
Thus, to avoid a similar situation currently festering in the federal circuits, this 
Court now has the opportunity to reconcile the previous holdings in Central Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) and Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000), 
of which are arguably the only two (2) cases in Utah addressing the issue of "appearance" 
under Rule 5(a)(2)(b), and to definitively define the meaning of appearance. Based on 
sound public policy considerations, the intent to preserve professional standards, the 
avoidance of unnecessary litigation and the arguments presented herein, Arbogast moves 
this Court to adopt the position that only a formal appearance (i.e. a formal submission or 
presentation to the court) will suffice to trigger notice requirements under Rules 5 and 55 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
A. District Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Appellee adopts Appellant's statement of District Court Proceedings and 
Disposition. 
B. Court of Appeals Proceedings and Disposition 
Appellee adopts Appellant's statement of Court of Appeals Proceedings and 
Disposition. 
C. Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review 
Appellee adopts Appellant's statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented 
for Review. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DUE TO THE SPLIT IN AUTHORITY AND CONFLICTING OPINIONS 
IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS, UTAH SHOULD DEFINITIVELY 
DEFINE "APPEARANCE" FOR PURPOSES OF RULE 5 AND RULE 55 
AS A FORMAL SUBMISSION OR PRESENTATION TO THE COURT. 
The issue presented to this Court for review is whether the Utah Court of Appeals 
erred in determining that Utah is "among the jurisdictions that require a presentation or 
submission to the district court" for purposes of Rules 5(a)(2)(B) and 55(b)(1)(A) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Arbogastl91 P.3d at 46. Contrary to the expressions 
made by River Crossings and the Court of Appeals below, such a holding is not simply a 
"minority" position. An in-depth review indicates the federal circuit courts are split as to 
the meaning of "appearance" and have different thresholds for determining the same. As 
such, this Court should affirm the decision in Arbogast and definitively define the 
meaning of "appearance," consistent with the plain language of the rule, as a formal 
submission or presentation to the court so as to avoid the floods of litigation enveloping 
the federal circuit courts.6 
Pursuant to Rule 5(a)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "a party in 
default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served with all pleadings 
and papers." (URCP 5(a)(2)(B) 2009)(emphasis added). If a party fails to appear in an 
action, the opposing party is permitted to obtain a default pursuant to Rule 55 of the Utah 
6
 River Crossings' numerous citations alone evidence the problem created by 
broadening the interpretation of appearance. 
6 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rule 55(b)(1)(A) states, "[u]pon request of the 
plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the 
defendant if: the default of the defendant is for failure to appear." (URCP 55(b)(1)(A) 
2009)(emphasis added). "Appearance" has traditionally been defined as "a coming in to 
court as a party to a suit, either in person or by an attorney, whether as plaintiff or 
defendant." Black's Law Dictionary 38 (2nd Pocket Ed. 2001) See also 10 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 2686 at 430 (3d. ed. 2008) 
("appearance" generally requires a presentation or submission to the court where the 
lawsuit is pending). Accordingly, per the language of the rules and the traditional 
definition of appearance, if a party fails to appear in an action, said party is not entitled to 
be served with copies any pleadings or papers (i.e. no prior notice of default proceedings). 
A. The Seventh Circuit Court Rejects Broad Interpretation Of 
"Appearance" Under Rule 55(b)(2) Of The Federal Rules Of Civil 
Procedure. 
Like Utah, the Seventh (7th) Federal Circuit Court has adopted a bright-line rule 
that a formal presentation or submission to the court is required to constitute an 
appearance for purposes of providing notice of default proceedings to parties who fail to 
"formally" appear in the action. The benchmark case in the 7th Circuit regarding 
"appearance" is Zuelzke Tool & Engineering Co.. Inc. v. Anderson Die Castings, Inc., 
925 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1991); See also Town & Country Kids, Inc. v. Protected Venture 
Inv. Trust # L ine . 178 F.R.D. 453, 455 (E.D.Va.1998) (requiring a formal submission to 
7 
the court)7. In Zuelzke, a default judgment was entered against the defendant for its 
failure to file an answer or responsive pleading after being served with the summons and 
complaint. Id. at 228. In an attempt to set aside the default judgment, the defendant 
sought relief under Rule 60(b). More notably, in an attempt to take a second bite at the 
apple, defendant also argued the default judgment was improper for plaintiffs failure to 
provide defendant with notice of the default proceedings pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 229. 
Similar to Arbogast8 the Zuelzke court found that "informal" settlement 
negotiations had taken place between the parties. Id. at 230. The defendant in Zuelzke 
argued that these "informal" settlement negotiations constituted appearance under FRCP 
Rule 55(b)(2); and in support of such position, referred to several cases that have also 
been referenced by River Crossings.9 Id. Despite the defendant's arguments and 
considering well-established policy generally disfavoring default judgments, the Zuelzke 
court concluded, 
Giving plain meaning to its language dictates that a party 'has appeared in the 
7
 The District Court for the Eastern Division of Virginia is within the jurisdiction 
of the 4th Federal Circuit Court and the Town & Country Kids opinion appears to be the 
benchmark case from such jurisdictions dealing with the issue of "appearance" under 
Rule 55(b)(2). 
8
 See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 41. 
9
 Particularly, Muiz v. Vidal 739 F. 2d 699 (1st Cir. 1984); H.F. Livermore Corp. 
v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F. 2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1970); and Charlton L. 
Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center. Inc., 556 F. 2d 308 (5th Cir. 1977). 
8 
action' under Rule 55(b)(2) only where a party has actually made some 
presentation or submission to the district court in the pending action...Moreover, it 
is a disservice to the legal system to distort the meaning of a concrete term such as 
'appearance' in order to provide a mechanism to save a party from a default 
judgment. Efficient court management and reliability of judicial process is 
enhanced by court records which disclose the critical procedural actions of the 
parties - - such as the entry of an appearance. 
Id. 
The Zuelzke court further supported its decision by stating, 
This minimal formal requirement does not deprive a district judge the opportunity 
to grant relief from a default judgment where warranted. If, for example, a 
defaulted party is lulled or induced into inaction by settlement discussions and 
foregoes filing an appearance and responsive pleading, relief may be sought on the 
basis of such conduct under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(1) - - without artificial 
reliance on Rule 55(b)(2). 
Id. at 23 0-231. 
Though River Crossings tries to categorize such approach as "strict" or 
"inflexible." However, per the Zuelzke court, such a minimal formal requirement of 
filing a formal submission or presentation to the court is not inflexible, strict or unduly 
harsh. Trial courts have the ability, if appropriate, to set aside default judgments under 
Rule 60(b) if so warranted.10 In fact, Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for such. FRCP 55(c) states, "[t]he court may set aside an entry of default for 
good cause, and it may set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b)." (FRCP 55(c) 
10
 "When an application is made to the court under Rule 55(b)(2) for the entry of 
judgment by default, the district judge is required to exercise sound judicial discretion in 
determining whether the judgment should be entered." 10 A. Wright, A. Miller & M. 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 2685 (3d. ed. 2008). 
9 
2009); See also Collex, Inc. v. Walsh. 394 F. Supp. 225, 227 (E.D. Penn. 1975)(Rule 
60(b) controls after judgment by default is entered). 
Furthermore, as specifically noted in the body of the opinion by the Zuelzke court, 
such a formal requirement provides "[e]fficient court management and reliability of 
judicial process..." Zuelzke, 925 F.2d at 230; See also Arbogastl91 P.3d at 45 quoting 10 
James Wm. Moore et al, Moore's Federal Practice, § 55.33[4][b] (3d. ed. 2008)(cThe 
Seventh Circuit has the better linguistic and practical argument"). The Arbogast court 
also recognized this ancillary benefit by stating, 
Because the court clerk is authorized to enter default judgment under rule 55 only 
if the party is in default for failure to appear and the other requirements are met, 
see Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b), one of the benefits of the minority position is that it 
creates a bright-line test that the clerk can use when determining whether or 
not default is appropriate. 
See Arbogast 191 P.3d at n. 9. (emphasis added). 
Despite the recognition by 7th Federal Circuit Court and the Utah Court of Appeals 
of such a benefit, River Crossings is concerned that by adopting such approach, "[t]he 
clerk cannot determine with certainty whether default is appropriate even under the 
minority approach." (See Appellant Brief at Pg. 15,11). Contrary to River Crossings' 
concern, under such a formal approach, the clerk absolutely and easily determines with 
certainty whether default, under the clerk's limited authority provided by URCP Rule 55, 
is appropriate. 
Moreover, it is not, and should not be, the clerk's responsibility to determine 
10 
whether "extensions] of time" to file responsive pleadings have been agreed upon by the 
parties or to determine whether one party was lulled into non-action by representations 
made by an opposing party, to name just a few examples. If the default of the defendant 
is for failure to appear, if the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person, if the 
defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1), or if the claim against the 
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation, the 
clerk has the authority11 to enter the default. See URCP 60(b). If there is good cause to 
set the default aside, Rule 60 provides the very medium in which to do so. At which the 
point, the court, not the clerk, will make an appropriate determination whether such relief 
is merited.12 
In the case sub judice, River Crossings never made a formal submission or 
presentation to the trial court. Upon review of the record, the clerk was able to readily 
determine that River Crossings had been properly served with the summons and 
11
 It is important to note that such authority is not discretionary. The official court 
record dictates whether the clerk enters default or not. If the record indicates that service 
of the summons and complaint has been realized and the party has failed to file a formal 
pleading with the court in response thereto, the entry of a default by the clerk is 
warranted. 
12
 There is ample Utah case law on the appropriate standards courts must adopt in 
determining whether to grant or deny relief sought under Rule 60(b). See State v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983)(a district court should exercise its discretion in 
favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather than on 
technicalities.); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) (...the courts generally tend to favor granting relief from default 
judgments where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party.)(emphasis added). 
11 
complaint. See Arbogastl91 P.3d at 41. Upon application for default by Arbogast, the 
clerk was also able to determine that River Crossings had failed to appear in the action 
due to the fact that the record was void of a responsive pleading to Arbogast's complaint. 
Id. Accordingly, the default was entered by the clerk. Id. After receiving notice of the 
default, River Crossings moved the district court for relief from judgment under Rule 
60(b). Id. 
However, the district court found that "[River Crossings'] actions and inactions in 
this matter d[id] not rise to the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or 
mistake." This finding by the trial court was affirmed in Arbogast. Id. at 47. River 
Crossings, nor a party who has failed to appear, should not be able to protract further 
litigation by then asking the trial court to conduct an additional analysis separate to that of 
a Rule 60(b) analysis. An analysis under Rule 60(b) for a party's failure to appear, rather 
than under Rule 55, is all encompassing and avoids a "yeah, but..." mentality; which 
mentality contradicts the policy and purpose of the rules and precludes the just, speedy 
and inexpensive disposition of cases.13 
The 7th Federal Circuit's approach of requiring formal submissions or 
presentations to the trial court gives plain meaning to the actual language of the rules and 
13
 In Wilson v. Moore & Associates. Inc., 564 F.2d 366, 367 (9th Cir. 1977) the 
court acknowledged and seemingly questioned the fact that the defendant did not even 
plea mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) - - "[rjather, [the] debate centered 
solely upon the alleged failure of the plaintiff to comply with the notice requirements of 
Fed.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)...". 
12 
should be definitively required by this Court. "It would have been an easy task to draft 
the rule to specifically state that notice of a default hearing is always required, yet this 
was not done. The language chosen evidences an intent to impose a notice requirement 
only in limited circumstances." North Cent. Illinois Laborers' Dist. Council v. S.J. Groves 
& Sons Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1988). Likewise, the language chosen by this 
Court in adopting the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should be plainly interpreted to 
require a formal submission or presentation to the court for "appearance" purposes under 
URCPRules5and55. 
B. The Third Federal Circuit Court Follows The Seventh Federal Circuit 
Court And Requires More Than Settlement Negotiations To Constitute 
Appearance Under Rule 55(b)(2) Of The Federal Rules Of Civil 
Procedure. 
Contrary to assertions made by River Crossings, the 7th Federal Circuit is not alone 
in refusing to interpret the phrase "appeared in an action" so broadly so as to wholly 
eviscerate the appearance requirement of Rule 55(b)(2). The 3rd Federal Circuit court 
also requires "some presentation or submission to the court." Port-Wide Container Co. v. 
Interstate Maintenance Corp.. 440 F.2d 1195 (3rd Cir. 1971). In Port-Wide, a default 
judgment was entered against the defendant for its failure to file a submission or 
presentation to the court. Id. at 1196. In fact, the Port-Wide facts are not too different 
from the facts sub judice. 
The Port-Wide court found that "over a period of many months after the filing of 
the complaint there were many oral and some written communications between counsel 
13 
for the parties with a view to settlement." Id. at 1196. It was further found that after the 
settlement efforts proved futile, the plaintiffs attorney sent defendant's attorney a letter 
stating, in material part, 
Kindly file your answer in the above matter by March 6, 1971. If the answer is not 
filed by that time I will seek a default. As you know, the Complaint was filed well 
over six months ago. 
Id. 
This letter in Porte-Wide, although similar to the June 29, 2006 letter provided by 
Arbogast to River Crossings,14 is vastly distinct from the Arbogast letter. Although the 
Arbogast letter did not use the exact language used in the Porte-Wide letter ("If the 
answer is not filed by that time I will seek a default.55) it was nonetheless received by 
River Crossings and the clear implication of default was present. See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 
41 and n. 15. Whereas in Porte-Wide, the defendant never received the letter from 
plaintiff. Id. 
Despite never receiving this final letter from plaintiff, the Port-Wide court held 
that "...participation in such negotiation[s] did not amount to an appearance in this 
action..." and the denial by the lower court of defendant's motion to vacate was affirmed. 
14
 Counsel for Arbogast sent a letter to River Crossings's counsel on June 29, 2006 
wherein it states in material part, "My client has previously granted your client an 
extension of time within which to answer the complaint. However, given the present state 
of the case, I am, on behalf of my client, hereby requesting that your client file an Answer 
to the complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter.55 See Arbogast 191 P.3d 
at 41-42. 
14 
Id. The standard adopted by the 3rd Federal Circuit requiring a formal submission or 
presentation to the court still applies today. Therefore, based on sound legal reasoning 
opined by the 7th and 3rd Federal Circuit courts and in order to avoid superfluous 
interpretation of the rule, this Court should definitively define "appearance" to mean a 
formal submission or presentation to the court. 
C. The Ninth and Eighth Federal Circuit Courts Differ From Other 
Circuits That Allow A More Broad Interpretation Of "Appearance" 
Under Rule 55(b)(2) Of The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure By 
Requiring That A Certain Higher Threshold Be Met. 
River Crossings asserts the 8th and 9th Federal Circuits are also among the courts 
that allow "liberal" interpretation of the meaning of "appearance" regardless of how 
nominal the contacts by defendant may be. See Appellants Brief at Pg. 9,1ftj 2-3. This 
assertion is not accurate. The benchmark case in regards to implementing a higher 
standard in order to constitute an "appearance" despite the failure to formally file a 
submission or presentation to the court is Wilson v. Moore & Associates, Inc., 564 F.2d 
366(9thCir. 1977). 
In Wilson, a default judgment was entered against the defendant for its failure to 
file a formal submission or presentation to the court. Id. Default judgment was entered 
despite the fact that defendant had written two letters to plaintiff contesting the 
allegations. Id. Although the Wilson court recognized that "[i]n limited situations, 
informal contacts between the parties have sufficed when the party in default has thereby 
15 
demonstrated a clear purpose to defend the suit15/' the court was "unwilling to hold that 
Moore's 'informal contacts' constituted the equivalent of a formal court appearance 
requiring strict 55(b)(2) notice in circumstances such as these..." Id. at 369. As a result, 
the proper, bright-line threshold was imposed upon defaulting parties in the 9th Federal 
Circuit. 
This higher, easily-determinable, threshold was imposed despite the recognition 
that other federal circuits had determined that similar communications would constitute 
an "appearance" for notice purposes. Despite such other holdings, the 9th Federal Circuit 
declined to follow suit. See Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized 
Technologies, Inc., 840 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1988) (the court referenced the Wilson opinion 
and stated, "this court noted H.F. Livermore but declined to follow it..."). There are 
serious doubts and concerns supporting the rationale and policy behind allowing a 
defaulting party to use only nominal efforts that amount to nothing more than delay and 
avoidance of plain and easily-followed procedural guidelines. 
On the flip side, a plaintiff in a matter is required to strictly adhere to the 
procedural guidelines in order to bring a cause of action against a defendant. There are a 
large number of rules that work together to ensure that a defendant receives fair notice of 
claims being filed against it. For example, URCP Rule 3 requires a plaintiff to actually 
15
 Quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F. 2d 
689 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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file a complaint. URCP Rule 4 requires the plaintiff to serve the complaint with a 
summons in a specified manner. Moreover, Rule 4 requires the use of certain language 
and it requires a definite time frame in which to serve the complaint and summons. 
Additionally, URCP Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to provide the defendant with a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and that 
a demand for judgment is being sought. Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to be simple, concise, 
and direct in its pleading. Without being redundant, the rules of civil procedure ensure 
that the rights of plaintiffs and defendants are protected and that neither party is unduly 
prejudiced.16 Additionally, URCP Rule 12(a) requires a defendant to "serve an answer 
within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the 
state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is complete 
outside the state," so too should this Court. In accordance with the 7th and 3rd Circuits and 
similar too, but just one step ahead of, the rationale of the 8th and 9th Circuits, the term 
"appearance" should be definitively defined to mean a formal submission or presentation 
to the court. 
16
 From a limited review of the applicable case law, it appears that none of the 
courts referenced herein nor in the brief of Appellant, have discussed the issue of whether 
an "informal appearance" triggers the requirements of a defendant under Rule 12(b). 
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D. The Second Federal Circuit Court Is Undecided On The Issue Of The 
Meaning Of Appearance Under Rule 55(b)(2) Of The Federal Rules Of 
Civil Procedure.17 
Again, contrary to the assertion of River Crossings, the 2nd Federal Circuit 
undoubtedly recognizes the conflicting opinions through the federal circuit regarding the 
meaning of "appearance" under FRCP 55(b)(2). In River Crossings' brief, it referenced 
the 2nd Federal Circuit case of New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2005) for the 
proposition that the 2nd Federal Circuit had held that "a party need merely indicate 'a clear 
purpose to defend the suit' to satisfy the appearance requirement under the federal rules." 
See Appellants Brief at Pg. 8, ^ 2. The New York court made no such finding. 
On the contrary, the New York court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny 
the defendant motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). In so 
doing, the New York court stated, the "[cjircuits are divided on whether anything less 
than a formal appearance is necessary to actuate the notice requirement of Rule 
55(b)(2)."18 Id. atl05. The New York court then went on to reference the bench mark 
opinions for both ends of the spectrum; H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft 
Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F. 2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(informal appearance with clear intent to 
defend suffice) and Zuelzke Tool & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Anderson Die Castings, Inc., 
17
 It also appears from in depth review of applicable federal case law, the 10th and 
11th Federal Circuits have yet to issue an opinion on the subject matter sub judice. 
18
 The New York court did recognize that the view of courts that have found 
"appearance" to be less then filing a formal submission or presentation to the court but 
have indicated a clear purpose to defend the suit is the "prevailing view." Id. at 105. 
18 
925 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1991)(formal submission to the court required). 
Immediately subsequent to these references, the New York court states, cc[w]e find 
it unnecessary in this case to resolve this issue." The New York court further states, 
"Therefore, even if an informal appearance would entitle a party to advance notice under 
Rule 55(b)(2) - - and we expressly do not decide that issue - - [defendant's 
communications with the State in this case did not rise to the level of an "appearance" 
under Rule 55(b)(2) even under the most liberal construction of the term." Id. at 106. 
(emphasis added). The New York court concluded its opinion on the issue by stating, 
a[i]n sum, even assuming (though not deciding) that in appropriate circumstances an 
"informal" appearance might suffice19 to trigger the notice of requirements of Rule 
55(b)(2), [defendants did not informally appear in this action..." Id. at 107 (emphasis 
added). 
With even the federal circuit courts recognizing the division and conflict now 
occurring in the federal courts in regards to the meaning of "appearance", this Court has 
the opportunity to preempt any such division or confusion from infiltrating Utah courts. 
This Court should definitively define that "appearance" for Rules 5 and 55 purposes 
19
 The New York court did reference, as did River Crossings, and compare the 6th 
Federal Circuit opinion of Lutomski v. Panther Valley Coin Exchange, 653 F.2d 270 (6th 
Cir. 1981) wherein the Lutomski court did find that two (2) extensions of time to answer 
the complaint provided by plaintiff to defendant were sufficient to constitute appearance. 
However, neither New York nor River Crossings mentioned that the case was "reversed 
insofar as it denies defendants the opportunity to reopen the question of damages, and the 
case is remanded for a hearing on that issue." Lutomski at 271. 
19 
requires parties to file a formal submission or presentation to the court; thereby 
supporting the language of well-established procedural rules and avoiding contradictions 
of sound policy to give plain meaning to the rules. Such an interpretation will prevent 
future litigation regarding the determination of what additional contacts or statements 
constitute an "appearance" under a liberal interpretation of the rules. 
H. WELL-ESTABLISHED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE 
UNDERLYING POLICIES DEVELOPED THROUGH NUMEROUS UTAH 
DECISIONS ANALYZING SUCH RULES MANDATE ADHERENCE TO 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE AND APPLICATION OF THE PROCEDURAL 
RULES. 
Although there exists a general policy to try to minimize the entry of default 
judgments and dispose of cases on their merits, there are times when the entry of default 
is appropriate. Rule 55(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure succinctly states, cc[u]pon 
request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs 
against the defendant if: the default of the defendant is for failure to appear." (URCP 
55(b) 2009)(emphasis added). Rule 5(a)(2)(b) also succinctly states, cca party in default 
for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served with all pleadings and 
papers." (URCP 5(a)(2)(b) 2009)(emphasis added). As argued supra, "appearance" is 
traditionally defined as a coming into court or the filing of a formal submission or 
presentation to the court. Thus, by the very language of the rules, if a party fails to 
"appear," the clerk may file the entry of default and the defaulting party is not entitled to 
notice of the same. 
20 
The United States Supreme Court states, "[i]t is 'a cardinal principle of statutory 
construction5 that 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be 
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.'" 
TRW Inc. v.Andrews. 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker. 533 U.S. 167, 
174 (2001)). Anything less than a coming into court or the filing of a formal submission 
or presentation to the court would render the word "appear" superfluous, void [or 
voidable] and insignificant.20 
A. Rule 60 Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure Expects Parties 
Affected By The Application Of Other Rules To Seek Relief 
Thereunder; And Consequently, Supports Plaint Interpretation Of The 
Language In The Rules. 
If a party is unjustly affected by the requirements of the rules of civil procedure, a 
medium is provided wherein such a party may seek relief from such adverse impact. The 
rules clearly anticipate judgments will be entered for a party's failure to appear. 
Accordingly, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect...55 (URCP 60(b)(1) 2009)(emphasis added). In order to 
ensure the general policy of avoiding default judgments is adhered to, the underlying 
20
 In addition, such a finding would render Rule 4(c)(1) void as such rule states, 
"[the summons] shall state the time within which the defendant is required to answer the 
complaint in writing, and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, 
judgment by default will be rendered against the defendant." (URCP 4(c)(1) 2009). 
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theory of the general policy is embedded in the very language of the rule. To reason that 
any rule, or any deviation therefrom, is for any other purpose but for the furtherance of 
justice is purblind. 
Although the plain language of "appearance" requires a party to formally file a 
submission or presentation to the court and fails to do so resulting in default, the party is 
given a life preserver under Rule 60(b). District courts then have broad discretion in 
deciding whether to set aside a default judgment based on facts presented by the 
defaulting party. See Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). However, such 
discretion is not unlimited as the district court's ruling must be based on "adequate 
findings of fact" and "on the law." See Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277, 279 (Utah 2000). 
Therefore, the district court must adequately determine whether the party's actions rise to 
the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake, or one of the other 
justifications specified by Rule 60(b). 
Although there is ample case law restating the rale which sets forth the standards 
required to set aside a default judgment, there is very little case law actually defining 
those standards. The Utah Supreme Court attempted to define "excusable neglect" by 
stating, "[w]e have heretofore defined 'excusable neglect' as the exercise of 'due 
diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. 
v. Industrial Commission. 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987). 
In Black's Title Inc. v. State Ins. DepU 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the 
22 
Black's Title court clarified the meaning of "due diligence" by stating that, "to 
demonstrate that the default was due to excusable neglect, 'the movant must show that he 
has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over 
which he had no control.'" Quoting Airkem Intermountain, Inc v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 
431 (Utah 1973) (emphasis added). 
The primary concern for almost every court that has adopted the open-ended 
meaning of "appearance" is to "...protect those parties who, although delaying in a formal 
sense by failing to file pleadings within the twenty-day period, have otherwise indicated 
to the moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit." H.F. Livermore, 432 F.2d at 691. 
Rule 60(b) satisfies this concern. If a party has indeed exercised due diligence so as to 
rise to the level of excusable neglect, mistake or surprise, the district court is required to 
apply the law;21 and, if appropriate, should set aside the default judgment.22 
River Crossings argues that such a following of the rules of civil procedure 
disavows or undermines the policy of trying cases on the merits. Again, this is not so. 
Adherence to the rules actually supports such policy. If a party wishes to enter settlement 
negotiations with the purpose of minimizng time and expense and are lulled into non-
21
 Particular to note, the vast majority of courts that have found informal contacts 
to constitute appearance have also found that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying motions to set aside default judgments under Rule 60(b). See Key Bank of Maine 
v. Tablecloth Textile Co. Corp.. 74 F.3d 349 (1st Cir. 1996)("[t]he district court abused its 
discretion when it denied [ajppellanf s motion to set aside default judgment.") 
22
 See Cannon 3, Chapter 12 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
(2009). 
23 
action by the opposing party, recourse is provided under Rule 60(b).23 See Zuelzke» 925 
F.2d at 231. To render the language of the rules superfluous simply to save the nominal 
expense of filing an answer is not the solution and is likely to ultimately increase the costs 
of litigation. 
Furthermore, a bright-line approach requiring the filing of a formal submission or 
presentation to the court is clearly not for the purpose of making life easier on the court 
clerks as River Crossings suggests. The Arbogast court did not say as much nor is that 
the argument contained herein. The Arbogast court opines that such a "bright-line" 
approach provides parties with a clear understanding of what is expected of them upon 
being served with a summons and complaint. Id. See URCP 4(c)(1). How parties conduct 
themselves after proper service of the summons and complaint is entirely up to them. 
Thus, although such policy is not as liberal as River Crossings would like, such policy is 
definite, unbiased, fair and imposes a duty upon the parties to act diligently lest suffer 
consequences. 
III. THE DECISIONS RENDERED IN CENTRAL BANK AND LUND ARE 
CONSISTENT WITH THE FORMAL APPROACH. 
There is simply no confusion of the opinion of the Central Bank court in regards to 
23
 See Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982)("[i]t is well 
settled that in obtaining a default judgment an attorney may not engage in deceitful or 
misleading conduct designed to lull a non-answering party into a false sense of security, 
without running the risk of having the default judgment set aside." E.g., Helgesen v. 
Invaneumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981). 
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the interpretation of appearance under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
Central Bank & Trust, 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982), the defendants not only had multiple 
contacts with the plaintiffs, but also specifically discussed the complaint with plaintiffs5 
counsel and indicated that they intended to defend by entering a special appearance. See 
Central Bank, 656 P.2d at 1010-1011. Despite recognizing that such communications 
were held between the parties, the Central Bank court states, in reference to Rule 5 and 
77, "...both of those rules expressly exclude parties in default from those entitled to 
notice." Central Bank thereby concluded, "...that plaintiff was under no duty to notify 
defendants of the default and that the trial court correctly rejected the argument that there 
was such a duty." 
Based on an accurate reading of Central Bank, the Arbogast court interpreted the 
opinion correctly and appropriately held that River Crossings had not appeared in the case 
sub judice. To suggest the Central Bank court.rendered an opinion "without any 
independent research, discussion or analysis" or otherwise ignored their judicial 
responsibilities to use sound discretion when applying the law is without reason and is 
nothing more than a critical self-serving statement. River Crossings then suggests the 
Central Bank court missed or ignored alleged "unethical procedural maneuvers" used by 
the plaintiff in obtaining default. 
Contrary to River Crossings' assertion, the Central Bank court specifically 
25 
addressed such concern.24 Specifically, the Central Bank court found, "there are no acts 
alleged on the part of Central Bank's counsel, up to and including the time default 
judgment was entered, that could reasonably have led the Jensens or their attorney to 
believe that it would be unnecessary to file an answer..." Id. at 1012. Therefore, to 
construe the Central Bank holding requires a formal appearance before the court to 
constitute appearance for purposes of URCP Rules 5 and 55 is accurate and proper. 
Further, in Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000), the defendants filed an action 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien they had filed on the plaintiffs property. In response to the 
action, the plaintiffs filed an answer and counterclaim of their own. Subsequently, before 
replies were due to the plaintiffs counterclaim, the defendants filed for bankruptcy and 
did not file a responsive pleading to the counterclaim. Id. 
Subsequently, counsel for the plaintiffs sought a default judgment against the 
defendants for failing to reply to the counterclaim. The trial court granted the plaintiffs 
their requested relief and entered a default judgment against the defendants. Id. On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the default judgment for this reason: the 
defendants were "...sufficiently excused...from replying to the Browns' counterclaim 
24
 See Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982)(c'[i]t is well 
settled that in obtaining a default judgment an attorney may not engage in deceitful or 
misleading conduct designed to lull a non-answering party into a false sense of security, 
without running the risk of having the default judgment set aside." 
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under rule 60(b). In addition, Lund and B&B have shown a meritorious defense2:) to the 
counterclaim." Id. at 284. 
The Lund court made a clear classification of parties in default; (1) parties who are 
in default and who have appeared; and (2) parties who are in default and who have not 
appeared. Id. at 282. Although the Lund court did reference federal case law that 
recognizes the more liberal approach for "appearance" purposes, and even found it to be 
"persuasive", it did not adopt the liberal standard. It would have been easy for the Lund 
court to include one sentence disavowing the Central Bank holding. It did not. 
Lund states, "in Central Bank & Trust, the defaulting party never made an 
appearance prior to having default judgment entered against him" while all the while 
recognizing that an appearance was formally entered in its own case. Id. at 282-283. 
What is more, the Lund court supported a strict reading of the rules of civil procedure by 
stating, "[mjoreover, were we to apply Central Bank & Trust's holding to all motions for 
default, we would render meaningless the provisions in URCP Rules 5 and 55 requiring 
notice of a motion for default in particular categories of cases." Id. Particularly, the 
Lund court was referring to Rule 5(a)(2)(b), "a party in default for any reason other than 
for failure to appear shall be served with all pleadings and papers." (emphasis added). 
25
 State v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983) held, "In order for defendant to 
be relieved from the default judgment, he must not only show that the judgment was 
entered against him through excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in Rule 60, 
but he must also show that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and that he 
has a meritorious defense to the action." Id. at 1056. 
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Thus, pursuant to this reading, the Lund court did in fact delve into the depths of 
what constitutes an appearance under Rule 5(a). With references to both URCP Rules 55 
and 5, it specifically affirmed the holding in Central Bank. Lund specifically states, 
"[ajccordinly, we distinguish Centeral Bank & Trust's holding from the instant case 
wherein Lund and B&B made an appearance." Id. The federal opinions referenced in 
Lund appear to be nothing more that guidance when courts analyze Rule 60 and the 
underlying questions associated therewith. Without the Lund court expressly stating 
otherwise is pure speculation. It appears from both Central Bank and Lund, Utah has in 
fact adopted the policy to give plain meaning to the language of the rules of civil 
procedure26 and requires that parties file a formal submission or presentation to the court 
to constitute appearance for purposes of Rule 5 and 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Therefore, pursuant to Lund and Central Bank, River Crossing did not file a formal 
appearance and fell within the classification of a party who was in default and who had 
not appeared. As the district court, of which was affirmed by the appellate court, did not 
find that River Crossings' actions rose to the level of excusable neglect under well 
established case law precedent, it was accurately determined that notice was not required 
to be provided to River Crossings. 
26
 Including, but not limited to, Rules 3, 4, 5, 8, 12 and 60 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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IV. THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DO NOT RUN AFOUL OF 
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE. 
Knowing the identity of an opposing party is distinctly different from formally 
appearing in an action by filing a formal submission or presentation to the court. Rule 14-
301(16) of the Utah Rules of Professional Practice states, 
Lawyers shall not cause the entry of default without first notifying other counsel 
whose identity is known, unless their clients' legitimate rights could be adversely 
affected, (emphasis added). 
River Crossings fails to acknowledge the key language in the rule. The keystone 
of the rule is the lawyer moving for default must know to whom notice is to be given. 
When counsel moves for default for the opposing party's failure to appear under Rules 5 
and 55, there exists a strong probability that counsel is not aware of the identity of other 
counsel, if any. Now, if a party has failed to "appear" pursuant to the rules of civil 
procedure and nevertheless made himself known to the moving party by any form, then 
admittedly, the moving counsel must first notify the other counsel prior to doing so to 
remain in compliance with Rule 14-301(16). Such a requirement simply intends to 
diminish the number of defaults filed upon parties who may have a valid reason to later 
allege excusable neglect, surprise or mistake under Rule 60. 
Contrary to assertions made by River Crossings, counsel for Arbogost complied 
with both the rules of civil procedure and the rules of professionalism and civility. As 
found in Arbogast there was some discussion between counsel for Arbogast and River 
Crossings that Arbogast would first provide notice prior to seeking default. See 
29 
Arbogast 191 P.3d at 41. Accordingly, prior to filing for default, Arbogast's counsel 
provided River Crossings with written advance notice27 that it was time to file an answer 
to Arbogast's complaint. Id. Arbogast can not be held responsible for River Crossings5 
counsel's negligence and failure to exercise due diligence. River Crossings could have 
responded or at least contacted counsel for Arbogast for clarity, if any were needed, to the 
June 29, 2006 Letter. 
As held in Black's Title, "because this neglect was caused by Black's failure to 
exercise due diligence, it was not to be excused." See Black's Title at 611. Similarly, 
River Crossings, nor any other party, should not be excused from judgment on account of 
attorney neglect and failure to exercise due diligence and should certainly not be excused 
by attempting to blame opposing counsel for the same. This would not be sound policy 
under either approach. 
V. RULE 55(b)(2) OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS 
DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT FROM RULE 55(b)(2) OF THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Although the Utah courts may look to the federal courts for guidance, FRCP 
55(b)(2) and URCP 55(b)(2) are distinctly different from one another. Rule 55(b)(2) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, 
In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court 
27
 The June 29, 2006 letter specifies and generally gives twenty (20) days prior 
notice. Moreover, Arbogast actually waits a total of thirty-two (32) days before finally 
submitting the default pleadings. 
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therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, 
it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any 
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, 
In all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default judgment. A 
default judgment may be entered against a minor or incompetent person only if 
represented by a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary who has 
appeared. If the party against whom a default judgment is sought has 
appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its representative 
must be served with written notice of the application at least 3 days before the 
hearing. The court may conduct hearings or make referrals — preserving any 
federal statutory right to a jury trial — when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it 
needs to: (A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) 
establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other 
matter, (emphasis added). 
As emphasized above, FRCP Rule 55(b)(2) is readily distinguishable from URCP 
55(b)(2). URCP 55 makes no mention of appearance and a fortiori, is void of any 
language requiring a party to give at least 3 days notice before a hearing regarding 
default. It would have been an easy task to draft the Utah rule to specifically include such 
language; however it did not. FRCP 55 seems to mandate a hearing in regards to the 
default and mandates 3-day advance written notice of the same to a party who has 
appeared. URCP 55 has no such requirement. Therefore, analogies of URCP 55 to 
FRCP 55 is tenuous at best and may be directly off-point. 
More particularly, the FRCP 55 (3-day advance written notice) requires a shot 
across the bow. Whereas under URCP 5 (the rule dealing with providing copies and/or 
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notice) the opposing party only gets copies of the pleadings filed with the court. By the 
time the opposing party receives the certificate of default and accompanying pleadings, it 
is highly likely that the opposing party's default has already been entered. The opposing 
party is then left to seek recourse under Rule 60(b). 
In the case at hand, River Crossings5 default would have already been entered even 
if a copy of the certificate of default had been mailed it. River Crossings lost its Rule 
60(b) arguments in both the district court and appellate court levels. Thus, the result of 
sending copies of the default pleadings would not have changed the outcome. 
VI. IF THIS COURT IS INCLINED TO ADOPT A MORE LIBERAL VIEW OF 
APPEARANCE FOR PURPOSES OF RULES 5 AND 55(b)(2), THIS 
COURT SHOULD FIND THAT ARBOGAST COMPLIED WITH RULE 
55(b)(2) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Although the Arbogast court rejects the district court's finding that River 
Crossings had appeared to some degree so as to require notice, both the district court and 
Arbogast court recognize that Arbogast did provide notice of default to River Crossings 
through the June 29, 2006 letter. The June 29, 2006 letter sent to River Crossings states 
in material part, 
My client has previously granted your client an extension of time within which to 
answer the complaint. However, given the present state of the case, I am, on 
behalf of my client, hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the 
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter, (emphasis added). 
The fact that the June 29, 2006 letter was sent by Arbogast and received by River 
Crossings is undisputed. However, River Crossings contends that because the language of 
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the letter did not actually use the word "default/5 it was not actually provided notice of 
the same. Recognizing such claim, the trial court addressed River Crossings5 counsel at 
the hearing on the Rule 60(b) motion and stated the following, "Counsel, doesn't that 
somewhat imply that? I mean, my reading of the letter, that's the way I look at it, quite 
frankly. So..." (R. at 185 at Pg. 26 ^j 8-10). In response to the trail court's comments, 
River Crossings' counsel responded by saying, "Well, the implication is there"as he 
continued to argue the issue of mistake of rules under Rule 60(b). (R. at 185 at Pg. 26 Y(| 
11-21). At the appellate level, the Arbogast court recognized and eluded to such 
colloquy. See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 48. 
For purposes of Rule 55(b)(2), not only did Arbogast give more than three (3) days 
prior written notice of its intention to pursue default proceedings, it provided River 
Crossings more than thirty (30) days from the date of this written notice; as it did not file 
for default until July 31, 2006. Arbogast did, in fact, provide River Crossings with 
advance written notice of the default. C.f. Porte-Wide Container Co. v. Interstate 
Maintenance Corp.. 440 F.2d 1195 (3rd Cir. 1971)(even though defendant never received 
a letter sent by plaintiff, of which letter was quite similar to the Arbogast letter, the court 
held "this circumstance did not make it inequitable for plaintiffs attorney, who had 
properly given notice of his intention, to proceed in accordance with the rules governing 
default."). Thus, even under the most liberal definition of the term "appearance," River 
Crossings should not be relieved of its default. 
It would be inequitable to Arbogast should the Court decide to liberally interpret 
the meaning of appearance under URCP 555 while strictly interpreting the notice 
requirement under URCP 5 (the mailing of all pleadings). As such, the June 29, 2006 
letter from Arbogast to River Crossings should satisfy the notice requirements of URCP 5 
when applying a liberal interpretation of the same. Thus, even under a liberal approach 
River Crossings should not be relieved from default. 
VIL IF THIS COURT IS INCLINED TO ADOPT A MORE LIBERAL VIEW OF 
APPEARANCE FOR PURPOSES OF RULES 5 AND 55(b)(2), THIS 
COURT SHOULD FURTHER FIND THAT RIVER CROSSINGS FAILED 
TO INDICATE A CLEAR PURPOSE TO DEFEND THE SUIT. 
Should this Court find the holdings of the federal courts that adopt a more liberal 
view of "appearance" persuasive, this Court should then also find that a party has 
indicated a clear purpose to defend the suit. See Wilson, 564 F.2d at 369 (comparing HJF. 
Livermore's requirement of demonstrating a clear purpose to defend the suit.). Here, 
River Crossings did not indicate a clear purpose to defend the suit. The Arbogast court 
states in n. 7, 
Even if Utah has adopted this standard, it is questionable whether River Crossings' 
actions actually indicated "a clear purpose to defend the suit." See New York v. 
Green, 420 F.3d 99, 105 (2nd Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although River Crossings participated in multiple settlement discussions, it did so 
through Nevada counsel; it does not appear that River Crossings obtained Utah 
counsel - - a necessary step for defending a lawsuit in Utah - - until after the 
default judgment had been entered. See generally Utah Supreme Court rules of 
Prof 1 Practice R. 14-802 ("[0]nly persons who are active, licensed members of 
the Bar in good standing may engage in the practice of law in Utah."). 
See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 48, n. 7. 
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Even under the liberal view of "appearance. River Crossings' actions did not rise 
to such level. Thus, under a liberal approach, River Crossings should not be relieved 
from default. 
VTIL ATTORNEY FEES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a] party 
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and 
set forth the legal basis for such an award." (URAP 24(a)(9) (2007)). "The general rule is 
that when a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also 
entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 
P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In the instant case, Arbogast was awarded its attorneys fees and costs at the trial 
court level pursuant to the Default Judgment. See R. at 35-36. In addition, Arbogast was 
awarded its attorneys fees at the appellate court level. See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 48. 
"Generally, attorney fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter of right under a contract or 
statute." Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). Here, attorneys fees are a matter of 
right under contract pursuant to the trust deed note entered into by the parties and signed 
by River Crossings. See Arbogast 191 P.3d at 48. The trust deed note reads in material 
part, 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or 
interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned...agree to pay all costs and 
expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. Id. 
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Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the trust deed note, the findings by both the 
district court and appellate court and the above arguments, Arbogast is entitled to its 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred at the district court level, the appellate court level and 
on appeal to this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The plain language of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that the 
meaning of "appearance" for the purposes of Rules 5 and 55 require a party to file a 
formal submission or presentation to the court. This view is based on sound policy, not to 
the exclusion thereof, and is consistent with the policy considerations adopted by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such view will provide efficient court management and 
reliability of judicial process. For the reasons argued herein, Appellee Arbogast Family 
Trust respectfully requests this Court to affirm the decision rendered by the Utah Court of 
Appeals and respectfully requests that a reasonable attorney fee be awarded. 
DATED this 2 ^ day of February, 2009. 
FARRIS & UTLEY, PC 
Tyler T. Todd 
Attorneys for Appellee Arbogast Family Trust 
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Before GREENWOOD, P J., McHUGH and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
McHUGH, Judge: 
If 1 River Crossings, LLC (River Crossings) appeals 
the trial court's denial of its rule 60(b) motion to set aside 
a default judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
| 2 Arbogast Family Trust (Arbogast) provided River 
Crossings a $2,450,000 loan. The loan was to be repaid 
with interest by September 16,2005. If repayment was 
more than five days late, the loan agreement provided for 
"[a] late payment penalty of [s]ix percent." River 
Crossings repaid the loan in full on October 7, 2005. 
Because the loan was not repaid within five days of 
September 16, 2005, Arbogast claimed it was entitled to a 
late payment penalty of over $148,000, plus interest. 
River Crossings stated that it was granted an extension of 
time to repay the loan and therefore contested that it 
owed any additional amount. Because of the dispute 
between the parties, River Crossings directed that 
approximately $178,000 be held in escrow until the 
dispute was resolved. These funds were eventually 
deposited with the trial court. 
K 3 On January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a complaint 
for declaratory judgment, seeking to obtain the funds held 
in escrow. Because River Crossings had previously 
informed Arbogast that it was represented by counsel and 
because of difficulties serving River Crossings directly, 
the trial court granted Arbogast's motion for alternate 
service. Accordingly, Arbogast served River Crossings' 
Nevada legal counsel, Black, LoBello & Sparks (BLS), 
with the complaint.(fhl) Counsel for Arbogast granted 
BLS at least two extensions to make a settlement offer, to 
seek Utah counsel, or both. According to River 
Crossings, counsel for Arbogast men told BLS in June 
2006 that he would not seek default without first 
notifying it. 
1 4 On June 28, 2006, BLS communicated a 
settlement offer to Arbogast's counsel. The next day, 
counsel for Arbogast sent a letter to BLS rejecting the 
offer. The letter also stated as follows: 
My client has previously granted your client an extension 
of time within which to answer the complaint However, 
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present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client, 
hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the 
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this 
letter. 
1 5 On June 30, the BLS attorney primarily 
responsible for the River Crossings matter was 
terminated. However, the June 29 letter was addressed to 
two other members of the firm who had taken 
responsibility for the case. On July 25, River Crossings' 
managing member sent an e-mail to Arbogast's principal. 
Although the e-mail requested that Arbogast's principal 
call River Crossings' managing member in order to 
"discuss the direction of [the] lawsuit," no further 
communication occurred. Six days later ~ approximately 
four months after service of the complaint and more than 
thirty days after the June 29 letter requesting an answer » 
Arbogast obtained a certificate of default from the court 
clerk. Arbogast did not provide River Crossings a copy of 
this certificate or its subsequent request for default 
judgment On August 10, the trial judge entered a default 
judgment. Notice of the judgment was sent to River 
Crossings on August 15. 
\ 6 River Crossings filed a rule 60 motion to set aside 
the default judgment on September 26, 2006, and 
arguments were held February 21, 2007.(fh2) During 
arguments, River Crossings' Utah legal counsel 
acknowledged that "this is a close case" Counsel also 
conceded that a formal appearance had not been entered 
and that "[Arbogast] didn't need to give notice [of the 
default motions] under Rule 5(2)(a)" In fact, counsel 
declared that he was "not claiming that because an 
appearance was made notice should have been given " 
The trial court determined "that [River Crossings'] actions 
and inactions in this matter d[id] not rise to the level of 
excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake " 
The trial court also found that although BLS did not 
formally appear m the action, "counsel's notification and 
communications with [ArbogastJ's counsel constitute an 
appearance and there was adequate notice given to 
[River Crossings], pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter " 
Accordingly, the court denied River Crossings' motion 
River Crossings appeals 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
K 7 River Crossings presents three arguments on 
appeal First, River Crossings argues that the default 
judgment should have been set aside because Arbogast 
failed to provide the notice required by rule 5(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "[T]he interpretation of a 
rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for 
correctness " Brown v Glover, 2000 UT 89, \ 15, 16 P 3d 
540 
| 8 Second, River Crossings argues that "the district 
court abusefd] its limited discretion m refusing to set 
aside the default judgment" "[A] trial court has broad 
discretion m deciding whether to set aside a default 
judgment" Lund v Brown, 2000 UT 75,1f 9, 11 P 3d 277 
However, "the court's discretion is not unlimited " Id 
K 9 Third, River Crossings argues that the trial court's 
"refus[alj to set aside the default judgment [was] based 
on faulty findings of fact" This court will reverse a trial 
court's factual findmgs only if the marshaled evidence 
demonstrates that they are clearly erroneous See 
Bingham Consolidation Co v Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 
434,1f 14, 105 P 3d 365 
ANALYSIS 
I Rule 5(a) 
f 10 Because of River Crossings' statements before 
the trial court and Arbogast's arguments on appeal, we 
begin by addressing whether River Crossings' rule 5 
arguments were preserved (fii3) l|X [A]s a general rule, 
claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised 
on appeal'" Tschaggeny v Milbank Ins Co , 2007 UT 37, 
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K 20, 163 P 3d 615 (alteration m original) (quoting State 
v Cram 2002 UT 37, % 9, 46 P 3d 230) 
Two policy considerations underlie th[is] preservation 
rule First, the rule exists to give the trial court an 
opportunity to address the claimed error, and if 
appropriate, correct it Second, requiring preservation of 
an issue prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial 
for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if 
the strategy fails 
Id (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) 
K 11 In this case, River Crossings' trial counsel did 
very little to raise the rule 5 issue before the trial 
court(fh4) and actually made statements during oral 
arguments that conflict with its position on appeal 
Nevertheless, the trial court specifically considered this 
issue and expressly found 
[t]hat pursuant to [the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] 
Rule 5(a)(2), [River Crossings'] counsel has not formally 
appeared m the instant action Nevertheless, [River 
Crossings'] counsel's notification and communications 
with [ArbogastJ's counsel constitute an appearance and 
there was adequate notice [ ] given to [River Crossings], 
pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter, that an answer was 
required to be filed m response to [ArbogastJ's complaint 
The trial court's findmgs do not simply mirror River 
Crossings' concessions but instead demonstrate a deeper 
analysis, which expressly addresses the application of 
rule 5 River Crossings does not challenge the trial court's 
finding that an appearance was entered, but rather the 
court's legal interpretation of rule 5 as stated in its ruling 
Neither of the two policy considerations for the 
preservation requirement prevent our review where the 
trial court has actually ruled on the issue, and River 
Crossings' arguments do not suggest a strategic decision 
to postpone review We therefore hold that, under the 
facts of this case, this issue is sufficiently preserved for 
appellate review (fh5) Cf Pratt v Nelson 2007 UT 41, K 
24, 164 P 3d 366 (determining issue was preserved where 
trial court received some notice of the issue and "made a 
specific ruling on the issue" even though petitioner did 
not address it in a timely manner) 
\ 12 Having determined that this issue is properly 
before us, we turn now to its merits Rule 5(a) declares 
that "every judgment, every order , every pleading 
every paper , every written motion , and every 
written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the 
parties " Utah R Cn P 5(a)(1) The rule "expresses the 
general principle that notice of all proceedmgsf, including 
default proceedings,] must be provided to all parties " 
Lund, 2000 UT 75, fl 20-27, 11 P 3d 277 However, 
*'[n]o service need be made on parties in default for 
failure to appear " Utah R Civ P 5(a)(2) 
^ 13 River Crossings argues that the trial court 
correctly determined that it had entered an appearance, 
but erred when it ruled that "adequate notice was given to 
[River Crossings] pursuant to the Tune 29, 2006 letter " 
Because we agree with Arbogast's argument that the trial 
court erred when it determined that River Crossings had 
entered an appearance, we need not address 
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River Crossings' contention regarding the sufficiency of 
notice. 
If 14- Two cases from the Utah Supreme Court have 
interpreted rule 5 and addressed what constitutes an 
appearance. In Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 
P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982), defense counsel contacted the 
plaintiffs counsel after the complaint was filed, advised 
counsel that he was representing the defendants, and 
discussed the complaint. See id. at 1010. The next day, 
defense counsel wrote a letter "requesting copies of the 
pleadings and all other documents." Id. The plaintiffs 
counsel "answered the letter, refusing to supply 
documentation to aid . . . in making a special appearance, 
but expressing a willingness to cooperate if [the 
defendants] appeared generally." Id. A few weeks later, 
the plaintiff obtained a default judgment without 
notifying the defendants or serving them under rule 5. See 
id; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 5. On appeal, the defendants 
argued that the default should be set aside because the 
plaintiff "had an obligation under Rule [] 5 . . . to notify" 
the defendants. Central Bank & Trust, 656 P.2d at 1011. 
The supreme court disagreed, "concluding] that plaintiff 
was under no duty to notify defendants of the default," 
id, and subsequently explained that the Central Bank & 
Trust defendants "never made an appearance prior to 
having default judgment entered against [them]," Lund v. 
Brown, 2000 UT 75, 1 27, 11 P.3d 277 (discussing 
Central Bank & Trust); see also Central Bank & Trust, 
656 P.2d at 1011-12 & n. 2 (emphasizing that "[n]o 
service need be made on parties in default for failure to 
appear" (emphasis omitted)). 
H 15 In Lundv. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277, the 
plaintiffs filed a complaint, and the defendants filed an 
answer and counterclaim. See id. ^ 3. However, the 
plaintiffs never-filed a reply to the counterclaim, and the 
defendants obtained default judgment without serving the 
plaintiffs with copies of the default papers pursuant to 
rule 5. See id. fl 4-5. The plaintiffs appealed the default 
judgment, arguing that they were entitled to service under 
rule 5. See id. ffi[ 1, 6. The supreme court agreed and 
reversed the default judgment.(fii6) See id. % 1. Notably, 
the supreme court distinguished Lund from Central Bank 
& Trust on the basis that Lund involved a "formal 
appearance" while Central Bank & Trust did not. See id. 
127. 
\ 16 Based on these two supreme court rulings, 
Arbogast argues that unless a party enters a formal 
appearance through a pleading in the trial court, it has not 
appeared and is not entitled to service under rule 5 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Because we believe 
Central Bank & Trust and Lund dictate this result, we 
agree. 
\ 17 To fully understand the import, of Central Bank 
& Trust and Lund, it is helpful to examine the manner in 
which other jurisdictions, and especially the federal 
courts, have interpreted similar rules. See id. (relying on 
outside sources). These jurisdictions have adhered to one 
of two conflicting positions when determining what 
constitutes an appearance. 
\ 18 The first, and the majority position, "is that 'the 
notice requirement . . .' applies not only to parties who 
have formally appeared, but also to'those parties who, 
although delaying in a formal sense by failing to file 
pleadings within the twenty-day period, have otherwise 
indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to defend 
the suit.'" New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 105 (2d 
Cir.2005) (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. 
Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe,432 F.2d 689, 691 
(D.C.Cir.1970) (per curiam)); see also id. (collecting 
cases); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 
(5th Cir. 1996) ("What constitutes an appearance is not 
confined to physical appearances in 
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court or the actual filing of a document in the record." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). River Crossings 
argues that Utah has adopted this standard.(m7) 
However, if this were truly the standard in Utah, we 
believe Central Bank & Trust would have been decided 
differently or disavowed by Lund.(fnS) 
H 19 In Central Bank & Trust, the defendants not only 
had multiple contacts with the plaintiffs, but also 
specifically discussed the complaint with plaintiffs' 
counsel and indicated that they intended to defend by 
entering a special appearance. See Central Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Jensen,656 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah 1982). See 
generally Barlow v. Cappo,Z2\ P.2d 465, 466 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) ("A special appearance is to contest a 
court's personal jurisdiction without submitting oneself to 
it."). Nevertheless, the supreme court later determined 
that the defendants "never made an appearance." Lund, 
2000 UT 75, If 27, 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank 
& Trust). Thus, Central Bank & Trust departs from with 
the majority rule, which merely requires an indication of 
"a clear purpose to defend the suit." See Green, 420 F.3d 
at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
| 20 On the other hand, the position applied by a 
minority of jurisdictions is consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's rulings in Central Bank & Trust and 
Lund. Under this standard, courts "strictly construe [] the 
term 'appearance' to require a party to make "some 
presentation or submission to the district court in the 
pending action.'" Id. (quoting Zuelzke Tool & Eng'g Co. 
v. Anderson Die Castings, Inc., 925 F.2d 226, 230 (7th 
Cir. 1991)); accord Plaza del Lago Townhomes Ass'n v. 
Highwood Builders, LLC,148 P.3d 367, 370-71 
(Colo.Ct.App. 2006); see also Black's Law Dictionary 
107 (8th ed.2004) (defining "appearance" as "[a] coming 
into court as a party or interested person" (emphasis 
added)); 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice § 55.33[4][b] (3d ed. 2008) ("The Seventh 
Circuit has the better linguistic and practical 
argument. ").(fh9) Under this standard, the supreme 
court's rulings in Central Bank & Trust and Lund are 
easily understood. In Central Bank & Trust, the 
defendant never made any presentation to the district 
court, see 656 P.2d at 1009-10, and thus "never made an 
appearance," Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, f 27, 11 P.3d 
277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust). In Lund, the 
plaintiffs made a presentation to the district court by 
filing a complaint and, therefore, were deemed to have 
appeared. See id. 
K 21 Despite the holdings of Central Bank & Trust 
and Lund, River Crossings 
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argues that Utah could not have adopted the minority 
position because it would be incompatible with Utah's 
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. We do not 
believe the two are incompatible. The Standards of 
Professionalism and Civility require notice before 
obtaining default. See Utah Standards of Professionalism 
& Civility 16 ("Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a 
default without first notifying other counsel whose 
identity is known. . . ."). Rule 5, on the other hand, 
concerns service at the time of filing. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
5. Thus, a party can easily comply with the standards of 
civility, even though service is not required under rule 5. 
For example, in this case, counsel would have acted in 
conformity with the standards of civility, even though he 
did not serve the actual papers under rule 5, if he had first 
called defense counsel and alerted him that default was 
imminent, (fii 10) 
122 Although the supreme court has never explicitly 
addressed the two competing lines of authority or defined 
what constitutes an appearance under rule 5, we believe 
the holdings of Central Bank & Trust and Lund place us 
among the jurisdictions that require a presentation or 
submission to the district court. Because River Crossings' 
legal counsel, like the defendants' legal counsel in 
Central Bank & Trust, never "ma[d]e some presentation 
or submission to the district court," Green, 420 F.3d at 
105, we hold that River Crossings never made an 
appearance pursuant to rule 5. For these reasons, we 
affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue. 
II. Rule 60(b) 
% 23 River Crossings argues "the district court abused 
its discretion in refusing to set a[si]de the default 
judgment [because River Crossings] presented a 
'reasonable excuse' for failing to file a responsive 
pleading." (Capitalization omitted.) Under rule 60(b), a 
"court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a part}' or 
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Although a 
trial court has broad discretion when determining whether 
to set aside default judgment under rule 60(b), "the 
court's discretion is not unlimited." Lund, 2000 UT 75, j^ 
9, 11 P.3d 277. Indeed, "the [disfavored] nature of a 
default judgment and the equitable nature of rule 60 
provide . . . limits." Id. \ 10. Thus, "it is quite uniformly 
regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment where there is reasonable justification 
or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely 
application is made to set it aside." Id ^ 11 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In this case, however, we 
cannot say the trial court exceeded its discretion. 
\ 24 River Crossings presents several arguments that 
it claims demonstrate a "good faith, legitimate belief that 
no action would or could be taken against them." See id. \ 
19 (determining such a belief "constitutes a'reasonable 
justification or excuse'").(fill 1) 
\ 25 First, River Crossings argues that "[b]ased on 
[Arbogast's counsel's express representation [] that he 
would not initiate default proceedings against River 
Crossings without first notifying opposing counsel, River 
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Crossings reasonably and justifiably believed that no 
action would be taken against it." Arbogast argues that it 
made this representation, if at all, only so that River 
Crossings would have adequate time to present a 
settlement offer or obtain local counsel.(fhl2) Arbogast 
further argues that once counsel sent the June 29, 2006 
letter rejecting River Crossings' settlement offer and 
requesting an answer, it was no longer reasonable for 
River Crossings to believe that it need not answer the 
complaint. The trial court agreed with Arbogast and 
found "[t]hat the contention that [River Crossings'] 
counsel expected notice prior to the default entry is 
unfounded given the express provisions of the June 29, 
2006 letter" requesting that an answer be filed 
f 26 Second, River Crossings argues that it has a 
reasonable excuse for not filing an answer because the 
attorney at BLS "who had been responsible for 
negotiating and communicating] with [Arbogast] was 
discharged, and the attorney who assumed those 
responsibilities went on an extended vacation." However, 
as the trial court found, the discharged BLS attorney was 
removed from the case before the June 29,2006 letter. 
Indeed, the June 29 letter was sent to the two lawyers 
who had assumed the responsibilities of the discharged 
attorney. Moreover, even if one of the replacement 
attorneys was on extended vacation, the other attorney 
was not. In fact, River Crossings declared to the trial 
court that it "dpdjn't want to make a big fact about" the 
other lawyer's vacation "because [her colleague] was 
aware of what was going on."(fhl3) Despite this 
awareness, no answer was filed. Thus, the trial court 
found that this "excuse [] . . . d[id] not constitute 
excusable neglect, inadvertent surprise or mistake." 
K27 Third, River Crossings argues that its "attorneys 
believed that settlement negotiations were ongoing." 
River Crossings bases this argument primarily on an 
e-mail that its managing member sent directly to 
Arbogast's principal — but not to Arbogast's counsel. In 
that e-mail, River Crossings' managing member simply 
stated, "Give me a call when you get a chance. We should 
probably discuss the direction of your lawsuit" Even 
assuming that the e-mail implied continued settlement 
discussions, it was not reasonable to assume that it freed 
River Crossings from filing an answer. This is especially 
true because the e-mail was not sent by River Crossings' 
legal counsel, Arbogast never responded to the e-mail, 
and Arbogast had explicitly rejected River Crossings' 
settlement efforts and requested an answer in its June 29 
letter. Accordingly, the trial court found that River 
Crossings failed to exercise due diligence and that it was 
this failure that ultimately resulted in the default 
judgment. 
U 28 After reviewing River Crossings' arguments, the 
facts of the case, and the trial court's rulings, we cannot 
say the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion. 
River Crossings conceded to the trial court that "this is a 
close case." Because "a trial court has [such] broad 
discretion" on this issue, Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, H 
9, HP.3d277 , we will not reverse an admittedly, and 
demonstrably, "close case." We recognize that default 
judgments are generally disfavored, but "[i]n the absence 
of an abuse of discretion, we [will] not undertake to 
substitute our idea of what is proper for that of the trial 
court." G.M. Leasing Corp. v. Murray First Thrift & 
Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Utah 1975) (refusing to 
substitute judgment on trial court's issuance of sanctions). 
Although we might have reached a different conclusion 
in the first instance, we affirm the trial court's ruling that 
River Crossings did not show reasonable justification or 
excuse for its failure to answer. 
III. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
\ 29 River Crossings' final contention is mat the 
"district court's refusal to set aside 
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the default judgment was based on faulty findings of 
fact" 
T[ 30 River Crossings argues the trial court incorrectly 
found that, other than the June 29,2006 letter, "[t]here 
were not any . . . discussions between [Arbogast]'s 
counsel and [River Crossings'] counsel between . . . June 
29, 2006 and August 18, 2006." However, River 
Crossings acknowledges that "the district court's finding 
is perhaps technically correct." In fact, the record before 
us indicates the trial court's ruling was correct. There is 
nothing in the record demonstrating any communication 
from River Crossings' legal counsel to Arbogast's legal 
counsel during this time period. The only communication 
is the July 25 e-mail that was sent from River Crossings' 
managing member to Arbogast's principal. Thus, this 
finding of fact is not clearly erroneous.(fhl4) 
% 31 River Crossings further contests the trial court's 
finding that the June 29, 2006 letter informed River 
Crossings that Arbogast was requiring an answer within 
twenty days. River Crossings argues that because the 
letter actually stated that Arbogast "[is] hereby requesting 
. . . an Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days," 
the trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous and the ruling 
must be reversed. We disagree. Regardless of the 
professional and civil tone of the June 29 letter, its 
message was clear: Arbogast had rejected River 
Crossings' settlement offer and was moving forward with 
the litigation. Indeed, River Crossings acknowledged this 
plain implication during oral arguments.(fiil5) 
Accordingly, the trial court's finding is not clearly 
erroneous. 
IV. Attorney Fees 
1 32 River Crossings does not appeal the trial court's 
grant of attorney fees to Arbogast, but argues that 
Arbogast is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Again, 
we disagree. 
U 33 The trust deed note provided that "[i]f this note is 
collected by an attorney after default in the payment of 
principal or interest, either with or without suit, the 
undersigned . . . agree to pay all costs and expenses of 
collection including a reasonable attorney's fee." 
Moreover, the trial court's judgment awarded Arbogast its 
attorney fees below. See generally Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald,96l P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (*'[W]hen a 
party who received attorney fees below prevails on 
appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably 
incurred on appeal." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1[ 34 River Crossings' only argument against an award 
of attorney fees on appeal is that "this appeal does not 
directly relate to Arbogast's collection efforts." However, 
this case directly concerns Arbogast's collection efforts; 
Arbogast filed suit to collect the amount it claims it was 
owed under the parties' agreement. Because this case 
concerns Arbogast's collection efforts and because 
Arbogast was awarded its attorney fees below, we 
remand to the trial court for a determination of the 
reasonable attorney fees Arbogast incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
H 35 We affirm the trial court's denial of River 
Crossings' rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default 
judgment and remand for a determination of the attorney 
fees Arbogast incurred on appeal. 
H 36 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Presiding Judge and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
Footnotes: 
FN1. River Crossings' counsel on appeal did not 
represent River Crossings during any of the proceedings 
in the trial court. 
FN2. By this time, River Crossings had hired a Utah 
law firm to represent it before the trial court. 
FN3. Our inquiry is made more difficult by River 
Crossings' failure to provide a "citation to the record 
showing that the issue was preserved" as required by rule 
24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Utah 
R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). 
FN4. River Crossings argues that it "tirelessly raised 
the issue of lack of notice of the default proceedings at 
every stage in this litigation." While River Crossings did 
address the lack of notice before the trial court, its 
arguments focused on whether notice was required 
because of Arbogast's assurance that it would not seek 
default without first notifying BLS. That issue is distinct 
from the issue on appeal, i.e., whether River Crossings 
was entitled to notice under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
FN5. We caution that a concession by trial counsel 
generally will prevent appellate review. See First Equity 
Corp. of Florida v. Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d 887, 892 n. 
5 (Utah 1975) ("Ordinarily, an appellant cannot raise a 
theory on appeal for the first time different from that 
presented to the Court below."); see also Pratt v. Nelson, 
2007 UT 41, 117, 164 P.3d 366 ("[A] party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party 
led the trial court into committing the error."). However, 
this case is unique because the trial court independently 
researched, analyzed, and determined the issue at hand, 
and that determination is part of the decision on appeal. 
FN6. The plaintiffs in Lund actually presented two 
arguments on appeal: (1) "[T]hat they were reasonably 
justified, for rule 60(b) purposes, in not replying to the 
[defendants' counterclaim" and (2) "that the 
[defendants' failure to notify them of the default motion 
justifies their failure to respond." Lund v. Brown, 2000 
UT 75, K 14, 11 P.3d 277. The supreme court found 
sufficient justification to reverse based solely on the first 
issue. See id. H 20. The court then addressed the second 
argument "to clarify the requirements of the procedural 
rules." Id. The court determined there was "additional 
justification" for reversal based on the defendants' failure 
to comply with rule 5. Id. 
FN7. Even if Utah had adopted this standard, it is 
questionable whether River Crossings' actions actually 
indicated "a clear purpose to defend the suit." See New 
York v.Green, 420 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir.2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Although River Crossings 
participated in multiple settlement discussions, it did so 
through its Nevada counsel; it does not appear that River 
Crossings obtained Utah counsel — a necessary step for 
defending a lawsuit in Utah — until after the default 
judgment had been entered. See generally Utah Supreme 
Court Rules of Prof 1 Practice R. 14-802 ("[0]nly persons 
who are active, licensed members of the Bar in good 
standing may engage in the practice of law in Utah."). 
FN8. The supreme court did acknowledge in Lund 
that "[a] much more compelling case can be made for 
requiring notice to a party who is in default but has 
nonetheless elected to participate at some level." 2000 UT 
75, H 24, 11 P.3d 277 (emphasis added). However, the 
court was not discussing what constitutes an appearance. 
See id. 1fl[ 23-26. Rather, the court was addressing 
whether or not service was required when a party 
appeared and then defaulted. See id. 1ft[ 4, 23-26 
(addressing situation where, after filing the complaint, the 
plaintiffs did not answer the defendants' counterclaim 
because they believed the action was stayed when the 
plaintiff filed for bankruptcy). Moreover, far from 
disavowing Central Bank & Trust, the court reaffirmed 
that case by reiterating that "[i]n Central Bank & Trust, 
the defaulting party never made an appearance." Id. \ 27. 
FN9. Because the court clerk is authorized to enter 
default judgment under rule 55 only if the party is in 
default for failure to appear and the other requirements 
are met, see Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b), one of the benefits of 
the minority position is that it creates a bright-line test 
that the clerk can use when determining whether or not 
default is appropriate. In contrast, "[t]he clerk is in no 
position to know whether there have been discussions or 
documents exchanged among the parties and thus, under 
the majority definition of the term, cannot determine with 
certainty whether any party has or has notx appeared' in 
the action." 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice § 55.33[4][b] (3d ed.2008). 
FN 10. During oral arguments on appeal, counsel for 
Arbogast stated that he believed his June 29, 2006 letter 
constituted sufficient notice under the Standards of 
Professionalism and Civility. We have no reason to 
question the sincerity of that belief. We think, however, 
the applicable standard requires more than a prospective 
notice that a complaint will be due in twenty days. 
Otherwise, a summons, which by rule informs a 
defendant when an answer is due, see Utah R. Civ. P. 
4(c)(1), would also be sufficient notice, and the 
applicable standard would have added little. We therefore 
interpret this particular standard as requiring notice after 
the allotted passage of time for filing an answer but 
before a party actually seeks to obtain the entry of 
default. 
FN11. River Crossings' primary argument to the trial 
court was that counsel had mistakenly believed the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure were similar to the Nevada 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which require three days notice 
before entering default judgment when a party has 
appeared. Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 55, yWr/zNev. R. Civ. 
P. 55(b)(2). See also McNair v. Rivera, 110 Nev. 463, 874 
P.2d 1240, 1245 (1994) ("An appearance for purposes of 
NRCP 55(b)(2) does not require a presentation or 
submission to the court; indeed, a course of negotiation 
between attorneys is sufficient to constitute an 
appearance. . . . " (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
River Crossings does not raise this argument on appeal. 
FN 12. Arbogast primarily contends that no such 
statement promising notification before default was 
made. 
FN 13. Even if counsel was not aware of the 
proceedings in this case, we are not convinced that relief 
under rule 60(b) would be required. See generally 
Kennard v. Kennard, 2008 UT App 134, fl 16, 21-24, 
183 P.3d 1052 (holding problems with counsel's mail 
were not sufficient grounds for rule 60 relief where 
counsel did not act with due diligence). 
FN 14. Nor do we agree with River Crossings' 
argument that the trial court's finding is misleading. Not 
only is the trial court's finding correct, but it helps refute 
River Crossings' supposed belief that settlement 
discussions were ongoing. All of the previous settlement 
discussions had occurred through the parties' respective 
counsel. The fact that all communication between counsel 
stopped after the June 29, 2006 letter suggests that 
settlement efforts had ceased. 
FN 15. The following colloquy occurred during oral 
arguments in the trial court: 
[Counsel:] Our argument is that the June 29th, 2006 
letter, while it said file an answer, I request that you file 
an answer, there wasn't the s[word] of Damocles, if you 
don't, boom, you are done . . . . 
[The Court]: Counsel, doesn't that somewhat imply that? . 
[Counsel]: Well, the implication is there. 
UT 
p.3dMy client has previously granted your 
client an extension of time within which to 
answer the complaint. However, given the 
42 
present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client, 
hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the 
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this 
letter. 
